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II.-1 
CATEGORIZING WAYNE’S WORLD:  
THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE  
AND PUBLIC ACCESS CHANNELS 
Abstract: On February 9, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit held, in Halleck v. Manhattan Community Access Corp., that a public 
access channel administered by the Manhattan Community Access Corporation 
and three of its employees was a public forum. In doing so, the court determined 
that a complaint against Manhattan Community Access Corporation and those 
three employees sufficiently alleged state action. The legal status of public access 
channels has been unsettled since 1996, when the Supreme Court explicitly chose 
not to decide whether public access channels were public forums in Denver Area 
Educational Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC. This Comment argues that 
the Second Circuit correctly determined that the public access channels at issue 
in Halleck were public forums, while refraining from making a sweeping proc-
lamation about all public access channels. This Comment further argues that such 
a broad categorization would be unwise since public access channels have differ-
ing characteristics, particularly in light of the fact that public access channels are 
negotiated between individual cable operators and franchising authorities. 
INTRODUCTION 
Public access channels allow individuals not affiliated with the cable op-
erator to broadcast non-commercial television shows on a channel dedicated to 
public access programs at no cost.1 A key feature of these channels is that they 
allow people to share their messages without censorship.2 The foundations of 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See LAURA R. LINDER, PUBLIC ACCESS TELEVISION: AMERICA’S ELECTRONIC SOAPBOX, at 
xxvi (1999) (providing functional and philosophical definitions of public access channels); see also 
Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC (Denver Area), 518 U.S. 727, 791 (1996) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing public access channels as available at 
little or no cost to the public on a “first-come, first-served basis,” detailing the programmer’s complete 
control over, and liability for, the content of the program, and noting that the technical aspects of the 
channel may be run by the cable operator, local government, or a third party). 
 2 See LINDER, supra note 1, at xxvi (stating public access channel users can put forth their mes-
sages to local viewers without it being “edited, filtered, or altered”). In New York, state regulations 
specify that channel time is granted on a “first-come, first-served,” non-discriminatory basis, that 
users are not charged, that the municipality cannot exercise editorial discretion, and that the cable 
operator generally cannot exercise editorial discretion over use of the channel. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. 
& REGS. tit. 16, § 895.4 (2018). The prohibition on editorial discretion does not apply to decisions 
prohibiting the airing of “obscenity or other content” that that is not protected by the First Amend-
ment. See id. § 895.4(c)(8). 
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public access channels in the United States can be traced to the 1960s.3 The 
issue of whether public access channels are public forums has been extremely 
divisive, leading Supreme Court Justices to reach differing conclusions the last 
time the issue was considered in 1996.4 The Second Circuit addressed this 
question in February 2018, in Halleck v. Manhattan Community Access Corp. 
(“Halleck II”), weighing in on an issue that previously divided courts.5 
Part I of this Comment expands on the history of public access channels 
and details the Second Circuit’s Halleck II decision.6 Part II details the legal 
status of public access channels as public forums.7 Part III argues that courts 
should decide whether public access channels are public forums on a case by 
case basis depending on whether the government controls the channel.8 
I. THE FACTS AND HISTORY OF HALLECK AND PUBLIC ACCESS CHANNELS 
Section A of this Part provides an overview of the history of, and basic 
law surrounding, public access channels.9 Section B then details the facts of 
the Second Circuit’s Halleck II case.10 Section C of this Part discusses the pro-
cedural history of Halleck II, and the current state of the litigation.11 
A. The History of Public Access Channels 
In 1969, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) recommended 
that cable operators set up public access channels in order to provide a plat-
form for members of the community to share their message and to offer spaces 
                                                                                                                           
 3 See LINDER, supra note 1, at 1–4 (noting that the rise of public access channels began in the 
1960s in response to the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 and Challenge for Change, an organization 
formed by the National Film Board of Canada to combat poverty by promoting change through film). 
 4 See generally Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 731 (showing that when the issue was first considered 
by the Supreme Court the Justices reached widely varying opinions). Regarding the pertinent issue of 
whether public access channels are public forums, Justice Breyer delivered an opinion joined by Jus-
tices Stevens, O’Connor, and Souter, explicitly declining to answer the question. Id. at 742. Justice 
Kennedy delivered an opinion, joined by Justice Ginsburg, concluding that public access channels are 
public forums. Id. at 783. Justice Thomas delivered an opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justice Scalia, concluding that public access channels are not public forums. Id. at 831. 
 5 See Halleck v. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. (Halleck II), 882 F.3d 300, 308 (2d Cir. 2018) 
(deciding the issue of whether a public access channel is a public forum and recognizing that district 
courts have reached different results). Compare Morrone v. CSC Holdings Corp., 363 F. Supp. 2d 
552, 558 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating that for purposes of determining whether a cable operator is taking 
state action, public access channels are not public forum), with Jersawitz v. People TV, 71 F. Supp. 2d 
1330, 1341–42 (N.D. Ga. 1999) (stating that cable operator’s cablecasting facilities are a designated 
public forum). 
 6 See infra notes 9–57 and accompanying text. 
 7 See infra notes 58–83 and accompanying text. 
 8 See infra notes 84–103 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 12–39 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 40–51 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 52–57 and accompanying text. 
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for communication that were not controlled by the cable operator.12 In 1972, 
the FCC released a report that required cable operators in the top one hundred 
markets to reserve three channels for public, educational, and governmental 
(“PEG”) access.13 Moreover, the report stated that cable operators could not 
censor or control the content broadcast on public access channels and would 
not be liable for that content.14 In 1976, the FCC amended the 1972 rules, plac-
ing less stringent public access requirements on cable providers.15 The FCC 
emphasized that, while it continued to recognize the benefit public access 
channels could bring, the abstract potential was outweighed by the negative 
impact of high costs and capacity limitations on cable operators.16 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See Laura Stein, Can the First Amendment Protect Public Space on U.S. Media Systems? The 
Case of Public Access Television, 5 COMM. L. & POL’Y 349, 357 (2000) (describing the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) recommendation and its underlying reasoning). The FCC did 
not implement any rules requiring public access channels at that time because the Commission felt the 
issue needed to be studied further, though it hinted that such rules could be implemented in the future. 
See First Report & Order, 20 F.C.C.2d 201, 205 (1969) (stating that, despite the lack of action at the 
time, public access channels might eventually be required). The FCC also stated that cable operators 
should act as common carriers on some designated channels and provide studios and technical assis-
tance for those channels with no control over the content of the channel. See id. at 207 (stating the 
FCC’s desire for cable operators to act as common carriers but reiterating that no action would be 
required until further studies had been done). 
 13 See Cable Television Report & Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 190, 197 (1972) (stating that cable 
operators must supply one public access, one government, and one education channel and laying out 
the reasoning why the top one hundred markets were chosen). The public access channels were to be 
non-commercial, offered on a non-discriminatory, “first-come, first-served basis” that were free of 
charge (except those incurred for production cost). See id. at 190–91. Although the regulations only 
applied to operators in the top one hundred markets, they permitted local franchising authorities in 
other markets to require cable operators to provide public access channels; however, those channel 
requirements could not be greater than those that the regulations apply to the top one hundred markets. 
See id. at 194 (allowing the imposition of regulations in localities not covered by the regulation, but 
placing limits on those regulations). 
 14 See id. at 195–96 (describing the content-related obligation of cable operators and addressing 
concerns of potential liability). The report explained that imposing state liability on an entity that 
could not control what is broadcast on public access channels could unconstitutionally frustrate the 
non-censorship requirement that had “the force of law.” Id. at 196. The FCC noted that the rules for-
bade the showing of obscene or indecent material. Id. at 194. 
 15 See Stein, supra note 12, at 357–58 (explaining that the regulations required cable systems with 
3,500 or more subscribers to provide access channels, “scal[ing] back its formerly high expectations 
of cable operators”). 
 16 See Report & Order, 59 F.C.C.2d 294, 296 (reiterating the FCC’s commitment to maintaining 
public access channels but recognizing cost concerns). The new rules required cable operators with 
over 3,500 subscribers to provide public access, even if they were not in a top one hundred market. Id. 
at 297. The FCC noted that under the new rules, 50% of all cable subscribers would be using a system 
that met the 3,500 subscriber threshold. Id. at 305. The FCC also acknowledged that the fact that high 
costs and a lack of demand underlined their decision to remove the requirements on smaller operators 
in major markets could justify barring local franchising authorities from imposing requirements on 
operators with less than 3,500 subscribers, but the FCC elected to continue to allow local franchising 
authorities to require public access. See id. at 324 (describing the FCC’s logic in continuing to allow 
local authorities to use their own discretion in imposing requirements). 
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In January 1979, in FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., the Supreme Court 
struck down the FCC’s 1972 rules and 1976 amendments regarding public ac-
cess channels as unconstitutional.17 In that case, the Court ruled that the FCC 
had exceeded its statutory authority granted to it in the Communications Act of 
1934, because it regulated cable systems as common carriers.18 Despite the 
ruling of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit that the FCC’s access 
rules violated the cable operator’s First Amendment rights, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Midwest Video Corp. was based solely on its interpretation 
of the statute and explicitly declined to address the potential First Amendment 
issues.19 The Court held that the FCC could not require public access channels 
without authorization from Congress, but did not address the constitutionality 
of such a hypothetical enabling statute.20 Despite this decision, the number of 
public access channels continued to grow in communities around the country.21 
Five years later, Congress provided legislative support for public access 
channels in the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984.22 The Act provided 
statutory authorization for franchising authorities to require channel capacity 
for PEG channels when granting franchises to cable operators.23 Cable opera-
tors were prohibited from exercising any control over what was shown on PEG 
channels proscribed by the Act.24 Further, under the Act cable operators could 
                                                                                                                           
 17 See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 708–09 (1979) (stating that in light of Con-
gress hesitation on the issue the Commission exceeded its authority by putting forth the access rules 
and regulating cable operators as common carriers). 
 18 Id. Although the Communication Act of 1934 was passed before cable television was invented, 
it still gave the FCC its authority. See id. at 696 (stating that, although the Communication Act of 
1934 was passed before cable television came into existence and therefore did not explicitly address 
television, the Court had previously ruled that the Act applied to cable operators) (citing United States 
v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968)). 
 19 See id. at 709 n.19 (stating that First Amendment concerns did not sway the Court’s decision). 
 20 Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. at 709. 
 21 See LINDER, supra note 1, at 9–10 (describing the growth of public access channels around the 
country including one program that began in 1978 in Austin, Texas, titled “Alternative Views,” which 
covered news usually ignored by mainstream media including shutting down the CIA, black power, 
and de-nuclearization). 
 22 The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 601, 98 Stat. 2779 (cod-
ified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2012)); see Stein, supra note 12, at 359 (stating the Cable Com-
munications Policy Act of 1984 was the first congressional approval of public access channels). Con-
gress was motivated by the cable industry’s desire for less regulation, and in light of Midwest Video 
Corp., it became evident that Congress needed to clarify whether public access channel requirements 
would be mandated or whether it would continue to be up to the franchising authority and cable opera-
tor to decide in negotiations for a franchise whether they were required. Midwest Video Corp., 440 
U.S. at 708–09; see LINDER, supra note 1, at 11 (describing Congress’s motivating factors). 
 23 See Cable Communications Policy Act, § 611(b), 98 Stat. at 2782 (codified as amended at 47 
U.S.C. § 531) (granting authority to localities to impose requirements on cable operators). 
 24 Id. at § 611(e). 
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not be held liable for programs shown on PEG channels.25 A congressional 
report on the Act, in justifying the authority given to municipalities to require 
public access channels, referred to them as the “video equivalent of the speak-
er’s soap box” and stated they would help provide a diversity of information to 
the public.26 The report further made the argument that the Act did not violate 
the First Amendment.27 Despite this congressional direction, lower courts that 
addressed the constitutionality of the public access portion of the Act were di-
vided.28 
In 1992, Congress passed the Cable Television Consumer Protection and 
Competition Act, which changed the nature of PEG channels.29 The Act re-
quired the FCC to enable cable operators to prohibit any programming on PEG 
channels that contained obscene or sexually explicit content, and content pro-
moting illegal conduct.30 The Act also made cable operators liable for obscene 
                                                                                                                           
 25 See id. at § 638, 98 Stat. at 2801 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 558) (clarifying that cable 
operators could be held liable for programming shown, except for that which was shown on PEG 
channels). 
 26 H.R. REP. NO. 98-934, at 30 (1984). The report further stated that public access channels al-
lowed those who would not have access to broadcast on television channels the power to become a 
voice in the “electronic marketplace of ideas.” Id. The term “speaker’s soap box” refers to the practice 
of speakers standing on soapboxes while giving speeches. See Thomas U. Walker, Mounting the 
Soapbox, 65 WESTERN FOLKLORE 65, 65 (2006) (describing “soapbox oratory” as spontaneous public 
speaking where the speaker would use a soapbox or similar object to raise themselves above their 
audience). 
 27 See H.R. REP. NO. 98-934, at 31 (noting that the public access provision was a “content-neutral 
structural regulation” that served the goal of providing a diverse set of views to the audience, which 
the courts had held to be constitutional in the past). 
 28 Compare Mo. Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. Kansas City, 723 F. Supp. 1347, 1351–52 (W.D. 
Mo. 1989) (holding that the public access channel created pursuant to the franchising agreement with 
the municipality was a public forum and the cable operator could not censor content), with Century 
Fed., Inc. v. Palo Alto, 648 F. Supp. 1465, 1476 (N.D. Ca. 1986) (holding that it is unconstitutional 
for a municipality to limit the First Amendment rights of a cable operator through franchising agree-
ments). 
 29 See Stein, supra note 12, at 360 (describing the changes brought about by the Cable Television 
Consumer Protection and Competition Act). Despite those changes, Congress made clear that it still 
supported public access channels. See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 2(a), 106 Stat. 1460 (reiterating congressional support for providing a di-
versity of views through public access channels as the cable industry had become dominated by a few 
operators with little potential for new competition). 
 30 See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 
§ 10(a), 106 Stat. at 1486 (amending the provisions regarding editorial control); see also 8 FCC Rcd. 
2638, 2638 (1993) (stating that the Act gave cable operators editorial control over public access channels 
to prevent obscene materials). The rules defined the terms “obscenity,” “sexually explicit material,” 
and “soliciting or promoting unlawful conduct.” Id. at 2639–41. The FCC adopted the Supreme Court’s 
obscenity standard by requiring a finding that, applying contemporary community standards, the content 
“appeals to the prurient interest” and “lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” Id. at 
2640 n.9; see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (setting forth the Supreme Court’s obscenity 
standard). The FCC defined sexually explicit content as content that is indecent. 8 FCC Rcd. at 2640–41. 
The FCC defined soliciting or promoting unlawful conduct as content that would be interpreted as unlaw-
II.-6 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:E. Supp. 
materials broadcast on public access channels.31 Following passage of the Ca-
ble Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act, the FCC promulgat-
ed rules that allowed cable operators to avoid liability by seeking certifications 
from programmers that the material to be broadcast did not contain any type of 
barred content.32 
In June 1995, in Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit directly addressed the constitution-
ality of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act.33 A 
group of organizations representing producers of programming for public ac-
cess channels argued that the Act violated the free speech clause of the First 
Amendment.34 The D.C. Circuit ruled that the public access channels were not 
public forums, despite the common carrier obligations imposed on the cable 
operators under the Act.35 On appeal, in June 1996, in Denver Area Education-
al Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC (“Denver Area”), the Supreme 
Court decided that the provision of the Act permitting editorial control as a 
means to prevent the broadcast of specified content violated the First Amend-
ment, because it was not appropriately tailored to achieve the Act’s objective 
of protecting children.36 In a plurality opinion, the Court explicitly declined to 
                                                                                                                           
ful solicitation of a crime. Id. at 2641. The rules did not cover speech promoting lawful civil disobedi-
ence. Id. 
 31 See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act, § 10(d), 106 Stat. at 1486 
(providing an exemption to general immunity for the broadcast of obscene material); see also 8 FCC 
Rcd. at 2638 (stating that the Act subjects cable operators to liability for obscene materials on public 
access channels). 
 32 8 FCC Rcd. at 2642. 
 33 See All. for Cmty. Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105, 110 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (stating the case is to 
review orders of the Federal Communications Commission putting the act into effect). 
 34 See id. (describing the controversy at issue in the suit). The plaintiffs also challenged the provi-
sions of the Act dealing with leased channels. Id. 
 35 See id. at 123 (stating the conclusion of the court that public access channels are not public 
forums). 
 36 See Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 733 (stating the conclusion of the Court that the Act was uncon-
stitutional). The Court balanced the benefit of the cable operator correcting the mistakes of those over-
seeing the content of the channel with the risk that the cable operator could be mistaken and block 
programming that was not patently offensive. Id. at 763. Those competing interests were weighed in 
light of the fact that the Court did not find a significant trend of indecent programming on public ac-
cess channels. Id. at 766. The Court concluded the government did not meet its burden of showing 
that the provision is “necessary to protect children or that it is appropriately tailored to secure that 
end.” Id. Justice Kennedy criticized the plurality opinion for not applying an established legal stand-
ard. See id. at 784 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (referring to the plurality’s 
failure to articulate a standard as “disturbing”). He noted that Supreme Court precedent gives “the 
most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon 
speech because of its content.” Id. at 783 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(quoting Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994)). According to Justice 
Kennedy, the plurality fell short of applying a clear standard of scrutiny; however, realizing they had 
to adopt some standard, the plurality used the formulation “whether the Act properly addresses an 
extremely important problem, without imposing, in light of the relevant interests, an unnecessarily 
great restriction on speech.” Id. at 786. Throughout the opinion the plurality used different phrases 
2019] The Public Forum Doctrine and Public Access Channels II.-7 
decide whether public access channels are public forums.37 Despite the plurali-
ty’s decision not to address the public forum question, Justices Kennedy and 
Thomas filed separate opinions articulating the two different potential answers 
to the question.38 Following Denver Area, federal courts have been divided as 
to whether public access channels should be considered public forums.39 
B. Factual Background of Halleck 
The Manhattan News Network (“MNN”) runs Manhattan’s public access 
channels.40 Deedee Halleck and Jesus Papoleto Melendez (collectively, the 
                                                                                                                           
such as “appropriately tailored”, “sufficiently tailored”, and “carefully and appropriately addressed.” 
Id. Justice Kennedy criticized this lack of an articulated standard for manipulating established stand-
ards meant to protect free speech, and suggested that Congress has a greater ability to restrict speech 
having to do with emerging technologies such as public access channels because the Court does not 
know how to apply a standard. Id. at 786–87. Justice Thomas also criticized the plurality for failing to 
adopt a clear standard. See id. at 818 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“This 
heretofore unknown standard is facially subjective and openly invites balancing of asserted speech 
interests to a degree not ordinarily permitted . . . . [R]elative rigidity is required by our precedents and 
is not of my own making.”). 
 37 See id. at 742 (plurality opinion) (stating it was too early to decide whether public access chan-
nels are public forums). 
 38 Id. at 780–812 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 812-838 (Thomas, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see Stein, supra note 12, at 367 (describing Justice Ken-
nedy’s and Justice Thomas’s differing opinions as two different ways in which Court could classify 
public access channels). 
 39 See Egli v. Strimel, No. 14-6204, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114312, at *10–12 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 
2015) (noting that whether forum analysis applies to public access channels is a difficult question, but 
that courts have held that the First Amendment protects free speech on those channels and “height-
ened scrutiny” applies to content restrictions); Brennan v. William Patterson Coll., 34 F. Supp. 3d 
416, 428 (D.N.J. 2014) (recognizing that a public access channel could be considered a public forum, 
but that such a holding requires a case by case analysis, and holding that the complaint at hand had a 
plausible claim regardless of whether the public access channel at issues was a public forum). Com-
pare Rhames v. City of Biddeford, 204 F. Supp. 2d 45, 52 (D. Me. 2002) (holding that if forum analy-
sis applies, public access channels should be treated as public forums), and Jersawitz, 71 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1341–42 (stating that cable operator’s cablecasting facilities are a designated public forum while 
their production facilities and equipment are a nonpublic forum), with Morrone, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 
558 (stating that for purposes of determining whether a cable operator is taking state action, public 
access channels are not public forum), and Glendora v. Hostetter, 916 F. Supp. 1339, 1341 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996) (recognizing that public access channels are not First Amendment “public forums”). 
 40 Halleck v. City of New York (Halleck I), 224 F. Supp. 3d 238, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). The City 
of New York granted cable franchises to Time Warner Entertainment Company (“Time Warner”). Id. 
As part of the agreement, Time Warner set aside public access channels. Id. Pursuant to the agree-
ment, the public access channels were administered by the community access organization (“CAO”), 
an “independent, not-for-profit, membership corporation,” which was appointed by the Manhattan 
Borough President. Id. The Borough President appointed the Manhattan News Network (“MNN”) to 
serve as the CAO. Id. MNN’s mission is to “ensure the ability of Manhattan residents to exercise their 
First Amendment rights through moving image media to create opportunities for communication, 
education, artistic expression and other non-commercial uses of video facilities on an open and equi-
table basis.” Id. The Manhattan Borough President has the power to select two of MNN’s thirteen 
board members. Id. MNN’s executive director is Daniel Coughlin, the programing director is Jean-
nette Santiago, and the manager of production and facilitation is Cory Brice. Id. at 239–40. Those 
II.-8 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:E. Supp. 
“Plaintiffs”) had been involved in producing content to be broadcast on 
MNN’s public access channels, but had a tumultuous relationship with MNN.41 
That conflicting relationship culminated in July 2012, when MNN held an 
event for the opening of a community center.42 The Plaintiffs stood outside of 
the event and interviewed those in attendance.43 Using the footage taken at the 
event, Halleck presented a video entitled “The 1% Visits the Barrio” (the “Vid-
eo”) to MNN to be aired on their public access channels.44 The Video ex-
pressed the view that MNN was “more interested in pleasing ‘the 1%’ than 
addressing the community programming needs of those living in East Har-
lem.”45 The Video was aired on a public access channel in October 2012.46 
Halleck subsequently received a letter from MNN informing her that she 
was suspended from airing programs over MNN’s public access channels for 
three months.47 The letter attributed the suspension to the Video’s violation of 
MNN’s program content restrictions which prohibited harassment or threats 
towards MNN staff and producers.48 The Plaintiffs, however, contended that 
the suspension was actually imposed because the Video was critical of MNN.49 
In July 2013, the Plaintiffs inquired about Melendez’s status at MNN, and he 
was subsequently suspended indefinitely from using MNN’s services and facil-
ities.50 Following the Plaintiffs’ inquiry into Melendez’s status, Halleck was 
again suspended, this time for one year.51 
                                                                                                                           
third individuals were named as defendants in Halleck I along with MNN and New York City. Id. 
MNN’s facility in East Harlem is known as El Barrio. Id at 240. 
 41 See Halleck II, 882 F.3d at 303 (describing the Plaintiffs’ actions and relationship with MNN). 
In December 2011, MNN barred Halleck and others from entering an MNN board meeting. Halleck I, 
224 F. Supp. 3d at 240–41. On March 14, 2012, the Plaintiffs attended a board meeting after receiving 
an invitation from defendant Coughlin. Id. at 241. Halleck began to videotape the meeting and it was 
immediately ended. Id. Soon after, defendant Morales spoke with Melendez and called him a “traitor.” 
Id. On March 23, 2012, Melendez and defendant Morales met to discuss MNN’s “community leader-
ship program.” Id. Defendant Morales screamed and threw papers at Melendez and subsequently 
withdrew Melendez’s invitation to participate in the program. Id. The reason given for the withdrawal 
was Melendez’s behavior on March 23, but the Plaintiffs believe the real reason was that Melendez 
had gone to the board meeting on March 14 that was videotaped by Halleck. Id. 
 42 Halleck II, 882 F.3d at 303. The opening of the community center was an invitation-only for-
mal ceremony. Halleck I, 224 F. Supp. 3d at 241. 
 43 Halleck II, 882 F.3d at 303. 
 44 Id. The Video can be viewed at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QEbMTGEQ1xc. 
 45 Halleck II, 882 F.3d at 303. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. The letter was sent by defendant Santiago and dated October 11, 2012. Id. 
 48 Id. Defendant Santiago claimed in the letter that Melendez made statements in the video that 
were intended to incite violence and harass the staff. Halleck I, 224 F. Supp. 3d at 241. 
 49 Halleck II, 882 F.3d at 303. 
 50 Halleck I, 224 F. Supp. 3d at 241. Defendant Coughlin claimed that Melendez threatened and 
shoved him during the July meeting. Id. The Plaintiffs alleged that Melendez was suspended because 
of the views he expressed in the Video. Halleck II, 882 F.3d at 303. 
 51 Halleck I, 224 F. Supp. 3d at 241–42. Defendant Coughlin claimed the suspension was the 
result of complaints MNN continued to receive about the Video. Id. 
2019] The Public Forum Doctrine and Public Access Channels II.-9 
C. Halleck’s Procedural History 
In December 2016, in Halleck v. City of New York (“Halleck I”), the 
Plaintiffs asserted claims of a First Amendment violation under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 against New York City, MNN, and three MNN employees.52 The dis-
trict court acknowledged that the claims against MNN and its employees were 
only viable if MNN was a state actor, because the First Amendment only ap-
plies to government action, but determined MNN was not.53 The district court 
also considered whether the public access channels at issues were public fo-
rums because they were created by a government order, but decided the chan-
nels were not.54 Because MNN was not a state actor and the channels were not 
public forums, the district court dismissed the First Amendment claims be-
cause there was no government action.55 In Halleck II, the Second Circuit re-
versed the district court’s decision as to MNN and its employees, but affirmed 
the dismissal as to the City.56 In doing so, the Second Circuit held that the pub-
                                                                                                                           
 52 Id. at 239. The Plaintiffs also brought state law claims under the State Free Speech Guarantee 
and the Open Meeting Law, but the district court declined to exercise jurisdiction over them. Id. 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 provides for a civil remedy against an individual acting under color of state law who 
deprives another person of rights guaranteed by the Constitution, holding them liable to the injured 
party. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 53 Halleck II, 882 F.3d at 303. The court weighed whether MNN’s actions could be considered 
government action under the Supreme Court’s Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. holding. 
See Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 399 (1995) (holding where the government 
creates a corporation for the furtherance of government objectives and retains permanent authority to 
appoint a majority of the directors, the corporation is part of the government for First Amendment 
purposes); Halleck II, 882 F.3d at 303–304 (deciding Lebron did not apply because the government 
only had the authority to appoint two of the thirteen MNN board members). 
 54 See Halleck II, 882 F.3d at 304 (describing the decision and logic of the district court judge). 
The district court decided the channels were not public forums because the “ownership and operation 
of an entertainment facility are not powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State” and because 
the court read Second Circuit precedent to implicitly reject that public access channels were public 
forums. Id. In June 1999, the Second Circuit had addressed a defendant’s suspension for programming 
on a leased channel. See Loce v. Time Warner Entm’t/Advance Newhouse P’ship, 191 F.3d 256, 268 
(2d Cir. 1999) (stating that defendant suspended plaintiffs for violating the indecent programming 
policy). There, the Second Circuit ruled that the First Amendment restrictions did not apply to the 
cable operator that provided the public access channels because the operator’s maintenance of the 
channels did not constitute state action. See id. at 267. The district court read Loce to implicitly reject 
the argument that public access channels are designated public forums and the district court agreed 
with that conclusion. See Halleck II, 882 F.3d at 304 (stating that the district court judge read Loce to 
reject the public forum argument). 
 55 Halleck II, 882 F.3d at 304. 
 56 See id. at 308 (stating the conclusion of the court reversing the district court’s decision regard-
ing MNN and upholding the decision regarding the City). The dismissal as to the city was upheld 
because the Second Circuit agreed with the district court that municipal liability under § 1983 only 
arises when the action taken was municipal policy and the policy at issue was not municipal policy. 
Id. 
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lic access channels administered by MNN were public forums, and MNN and 
its employees were therefore constrained by the First Amendment.57 
II. THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE’S APPLICABILITY TO  
PUBLIC ACCESS CHANNELS 
Section A of this Part provides a basic overview of the public forum doc-
trine.58 Section B then details the conflicting opinions of Justice Thomas and 
Justice Kennedy in Denver Area, and their application of the doctrine to public 
access channels.59 Section C discusses the Second Circuit’s Halleck II deci-
sion, and that court’s application of the public forum doctrine to public access 
channels.60 
A. The Public Forum Doctrine 
The public forum doctrine dictates that the state’s ability to regulate ex-
pression in places that historically or by government authorization have been 
dedicated to the free exchange of ideas is very limited.61 The Supreme Court 
has recognized two types of public forums.62 The first type of public forum is a 
public place that has historically been used for open communication and de-
bate between citizens.63 In this type of public forum, referred to as the tradi-
tional public forum, the state must satisfy strict scrutiny to exclude certain 
communications on the basis of the communication’s content. 64 The second 
                                                                                                                           
 57 Id. The Second Circuit did not view Loce in the same light as the district court. See id. at 307 
(noting that Loce concerned leased television channels which existed to promote competition and 
delivery diverse sources of programming, while public access channels existed to give the public the 
opportunity to express its views, and that the different purposes of each underscore why public access 
channels were public forums). Poignantly, the court noted “[l]eased channels concern economics” and 
that “[p]ublic access channels concern democracy.” Id. 
 58 See infra notes 61–66 and accompanying text. 
 59 See infra notes 67–78 and accompanying text. 
 60 See infra notes 79–83 and accompanying text. 
 61 See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (defining the 
public forum doctrine). 
 62 See id. at 45–46 (recognizing the traditional public forum, the designated public forum which is 
public property that has been opened up for expressive activity, and a distinct third type of public 
property which is not considered a public forum). 
 63 See id. at 45 (describing the traditional public forum). Public streets and parks are the archetype 
examples of the traditional public forum. Id. Streets and parks have historically been held in trust for 
public use; the use of these places for discussions between citizens is a longstanding tradition and is 
considered a right of citizens. See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (de-
scribing the historical role of streets and parks as public forums). The right to speech in these public 
places cannot be limited, but it may be regulated in the interest of all and must be compatible with 
peace, order, and comfort of all. Id. at 515–16. 
 64 See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (stating that in order to pass strict scrutiny, the state must show the 
regulation “is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve 
that end”); see also Michael Kagan, When Immigrants Speak: The Precarious Status of Non-Citizen 
2019] The Public Forum Doctrine and Public Access Channels II.-11 
type of public forum, public property that the state opens for the public to use 
for expressive activity, is referred to as a designated public forum and is held 
to the same standard as a traditional public forum.65 A designated public forum 
is created when the government opens property, that does not qualify as a tradi-
tional public forum, for the public or a class of speakers to use for “expressive 
activity.”66 
B. Kennedy v. Thomas: Differing Views on the Applicability of the  
Public Forum Doctrine to Public Access Channels 
In Denver Area, Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas laid out conflicting 
opinions on whether public access channels should be considered public fo-
rums.67 Justice Kennedy articulated the argument for holding that public access 
channels are designated public forums.68 Justice Kennedy opined that a forum 
does not have to be owned by the government to be a public forum, so the pub-
lic access channels could be public forums even though they are owned by the 
cable operator.69 Justice Kennedy stated that the case did not warrant a broad 
proclamation of whether the government can make private property a public 
forum.70 Looking at the specific case of public access channels, Justice Kenne-
                                                                                                                           
Speech Under the First Amendment, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1237, 1271 (2000) (stating that scrutiny increas-
es when there are limitations on speech in a public forum and lessens when the restrictions are in a 
non-public forum or limited public forum). Strict scrutiny is used to determine the constitutionality of 
laws that violate a person’s fundamental rights such as free speech, or equal protection. See Adam 
Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal 
Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 799–802 (2006) (describing the birth of the strict scrutiny doctrine, its 
test, and its application). 
 65 See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45–46 (noting that, while the state is not required to keep designated 
public forums open to the public, as long as it does so the same rules governing traditional public 
forums apply); see also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267–70 (1982) (declaring that when a state 
university placed a content-based exclusion on a religious group holding meetings in university facili-
ties where it regularly allowed student groups to meet, the university had to show the exclusion served 
a compelling state interest and was narrowly drawn to serve that interest). 
 66 See Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678–80 (1998) (describing the 
difference between designated public forums, which are generally open to a category of speakers, and 
nonpublic forums, where there is selective access and individuals must obtain permission to use the 
property). 
 67 Compare Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC (Denver Area), 518 U.S. 727, 
780–812 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concluding that public access 
channels are public forums), with id. at 812–38 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(concluding that public access channels are not public forums). 
 68 See id. at 780–84 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that public 
access channels are public forums and referring to the plurality’s decision not to adopt an established 
legal standard as the most troubling aspect of the opinion). Justice Kennedy referred to the advent and 
following of standards the “central achievement of our First Amendment jurisprudence.” Id. at 785. 
 69 See id. at 792 (comparing public access channels to privately owned streets and sidewalks 
because they are public forums that exist over property that is owned by a private party). 
 70 See id. at 793 (noting the hesitancy of the plurality to classify public access channels as public 
forums and explaining their reluctance is misguided). 
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dy wrote that it is clear that when the government and a private party contract 
to allow the government to use private property for public expression, a public 
forum is created.71 Justice Kennedy noted that a public forum designation car-
ries significant weight because content based regulations in a designated public 
forum are subject to strict scrutiny, meaning they must be “narrowly drawn to 
achieve a compelling state interest.”72 
In his opinion, Justice Thomas maintained that public access channels are 
not public forums.73 Justice Thomas stated that the case cited by Justice Ken-
nedy to support the notion that private land designated for public use can be a 
public forum did not apply to public access channels because that case in-
volved “enforceable public easements.”74 Justice Thomas argued that public 
forum cases in the past dealt with property that the government had a recog-
nized property interest in, which allowed the government to act as the owner of 
the property and designate it as a public forum.75 According to Justice Thomas, 
although public access channels were required by local governments, there was 
no indication that the franchising authority took a property interest in the 
channels and thus could not designate them as public forums.76 Justice Thomas 
pointed out that in no other recognized public forum did a private entity have 
to help create and broadcast the speaker’s message.77 Justice Thomas wrote 
that in traditional public forums the government must be the one to enforce the 
forum’s openness, but that it was often the cable operators that bear the burden 
of enforcing the openness of and administering public access channels.78 
                                                                                                                           
 71 See id. at 794 (describing how public access channels are created and in explaining in those 
cases where the government contracts to use private property for public expression a public forum is 
created). 
 72 Id.; see id. at 826 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing that “con-
tent-based prohibitions in a public forum must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state 
interest”). 
 73 Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 826 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing 
that public access channels are not public forums). 
 74 See id. at 827 (stating that “private property dedicated to public use” refers to designated land 
for streets and parks during the subdivision of land for developments which “at least created an en-
forceable public easement”). 
 75 See id. at 828 (recognizing cases where the government has found private property to be a 
public forum because of government property interest). Justice Kennedy attempted to refute this point 
in his opinion by stating property law recognizes many ways to create an enforceable easement, in-
cluding through contract. See id. at 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (rebut-
ting Justice Thomas’s assertion that a formal easement is necessary). 
 76 See id. at 828 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing cases in which a 
formal property interest existed). 
 77 See id. at 829 (pointing out cable operators often have to manage and to some extent control the 
public access channel they provide). 
 78 See id. at 830 (comparing the nature of public access channels and their administration by pri-
vate cable operators to that of traditional public forum which are usually run by the government). 
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C. The Second Circuit’s Application of the Public Forum  
Doctrine to Public Access Channels 
In Halleck II, the Second Circuit addressed the question the Supreme 
Court refused to answer in Denver Area and lower courts have been divided 
on: should public access channels be considered public forums?79 After con-
sidering the numerous opinions in Denver Area, the Second Circuit adopted 
the view espoused by Justice Kennedy.80 The Second Circuit did not decide 
whether the public access channels at issue were public forums based solely on 
their role as the electronic version of a “public square.”81 Instead, the court 
concluded that the public access channels at issue were public forums because 
of the specific characteristics they possessed, specifically that federal law au-
thorized the channels, state law and the municipality required the channels, and 
the municipality put in place a private entity to run the channels.82 The Second 
Circuit held that public access channels authorized by Congress to be “the vid-
eo equivalent of the speaker’s soapbox” and operating under the powers grant-
ed by a municipality as seen in Halleck II, are public forums.83 
III. PUTTING THE PUBLIC IN PUBLIC FORUM 
By ruling that the public access channels at issue in Halleck II were pub-
lic forums, the Second Circuit ensured that the channels would fulfill their in-
tended purpose to give the members of the public the ability to express their 
views via electronic communication without censorship.84 The court did not 
hold that public access channels are public forums solely because of the func-
                                                                                                                           
 79 See Halleck v. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. (Halleck II), 882 F.3d 300, 308 (2d Cir. 2018) 
(addressing the public forum issue). The court noted that whether the plaintiffs’ claim was viable 
depended on whether MNN’s actions were state action. Id. at 304. Public forums are usually operated 
by the state, so the question of whether there has been state action is usually answered by determining 
whether the place in question is a public forum. Id. at 306. The public access channels in the case were 
operated by MNN, a private not for profit corporation. Id. at 307. The court then had to analyze 
whether the individuals who took the action in the public forum were adequately connected to the 
municipality such that they are deemed state actors. See id. (analyzing MNN’s relationship to the 
municipality). The court determined that MNN employees could be considered state actors because 
their authority to run the public access channels was given to them by the municipality and thus they 
were not “interlopers in a public forum.” Id. 
 80 See id. at 306 (explaining the different opinions in Denver Area and stating the Second Circuit 
was “persuaded by the conclusion reached by Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg”). 
 81 Id. 
 82 See id. (outlining the traits of the specific public access channel at issue). The Second Circuit 
also recognized that a state regulation permitted cable operators to censor content not protected by the 
First Amendment. Id. at 306 n.7. 
 83 Id. at 308. 
 84 See Halleck v. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. (Halleck II), 882 F.3d 300, 307–08 (2d Cir. 
2018) (stating that public access channels are “the video equivalent of the speaker’s soap box or the 
electronic parallel to the printed leaflet”). 
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tion they perform, instead ruling that the channels at issue in Halleck II were 
public forums because of their specific characteristics, one of which was that 
the municipality gave a private corporation the power to run the channels.85 
One of the keys to the Second Circuit’s decision was that the channels were 
operated by an entity deemed to be a state actor, not a private cable operator.86 
This is the appropriate standard by which future public access channel cases 
raising the public forum question should be decided.87 
The reasoning that who controls the channel matters is in line with the 
Second Circuit’s pre-Halleck II precedent concerning leased public access 
channels.88 In the Second Circuit’s earlier Loce v. Time Warner Entertainment 
Advance/Newhouse Partnership decision, the defendant was the cable opera-
tor.89 There the Second Circuit found that neither the cable operator’s policy 
nor its decision not to air the plaintiff’s programming was state action.90 Un-
like in Halleck II, there was no evidence of government action apart from 
granting the franchise agreement and federal law mandating the maintenance 
of leased access channels.91 This reasoning is also in line with the decisions of 
lower courts and other circuits that have decided the public forum doctrine is 
applicable to channels run by public entities or private entities deemed to be 
taking governmental action.92 
                                                                                                                           
 85 See id. at 306 (specifying the municipality gave MNN the power to run the channel). The regu-
lations the plaintiffs were charged with violating and the facilities in question were those of MNN, not 
the cable operator. See id. at 303 (stating that the plaintiffs allegedly violated the content restrictions 
of MNN). The franchise agreement required MNN to promulgate rules and regulations, and to main-
tain open channel access, production assistance and production tools. Halleck v. City of New York 
(Halleck I), 224 F. Supp. 3d 238, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). The Second Circuit determined that the ac-
tions of MNN were appropriately connected to the municipality to be considered state actors because 
the action they took was pursuant to the authority given to them by the municipality. See Halleck II, 
882 F.3d at 307 (outlining the connection between MNN and the municipality). 
 86 See Halleck II, 882 F.3d at 307 (stating a connection to the municipality was established in the 
case because MNN’s power was given to them by the municipality). 
 87 See id. (ensuring there is a sufficient connection to a municipality to establish state action). 
 88 See id. (pointing out the different purposes of public access channels and leased access chan-
nels). 
 89 See Loce v. Time Warner Entm’t Advance/Newhouse P’ship, 191 F.3d 256, 258 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(stating the plaintiffs were suing the cable operator because the operator would not broadcast plain-
tiffs’ programing due to it violating the policy of the operator). 
 90 See id. at 267 (stating the fact that federal law mandated the cable operator have leased access 
channels and the cable operator’s franchise was granted by the municipality was not enough to classi-
fy their actions as state actions). 
 91 See Halleck II, 882 F.3d at 307 (finding state action); Loce, 191 F.3d at 266–67 (finding a lack 
of state action). 
 92 See Coplin v. Fairfield Pub. Access Television Comm., 111 F.3d 1395, 1398, 1402 n.4 (8th Cir. 
1997) (stating that a public access channel operated by “regulatory and advisory board” and created 
by the city council would normally be considered a public forum, but due to the Denver decision, 
doubt was cast on that classification); Wilcher v. City of Akron, No. 5:05-CV-0866, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 9470, at *25 (N.D. Oh. May 13, 2005) (stating that public access channel was not a public 
forum because the channel was owned and controlled by the cable operator, supervision of the channel 
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In his concurrence in Denver Area, Justice Kennedy stated that public fo-
rums can exist beyond the confines of government property.93 Justice Kenne-
dy’s pronouncement finds supported in the Supreme Court’s decision in Cor-
nelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, where the Court held 
that “private property dedicated to public use” can be subject to the First 
Amendment.94 Further support can be seen in Southeastern Promotions, Lim-
ited v. Conrad, where the Supreme Court stated that a private theatre under a 
long-term lease to the city was a public forum.95 
The provision of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competi-
tion Act at issue in Denver Area allowed cable operators to exercise editorial 
discretion over offensive sexual material on public access channels.96 Allowing 
the cable operators to exercise editorial control meant that the channels would, 
at the very least, be jointly operated by the cable operator and the authority 
managing the public access channel (if not the cable operator).97 Despite de-
clining to apply the public forum doctrine to public access channels, the Court 
decided to strike down the provision and bar cable operators from exercising 
editorial discretion over public access channels.98 That bar allowed for the sit-
uation the Second Circuit addressed in Halleck II, where the municipality cre-
ated an agreement that removed the cable operator from the management of 
the public access channels they provided.99 
                                                                                                                           
was not conducted by the municipality, and the municipality only had “indirect regulatory control” 
over the public access channel); Morrone v. CSC Holdings Corp., 363 F. Supp. 2d 552, 554, 558 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (deciding that public access channels were not public forums and the cable operator 
controlling the channel at issue was not a state actor); Demarest v. Athol/Orange Cmty. Television, 
Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 82, 84, 93 (D. Mass. 2002) (declining to decide if “municipally authorized and 
operated” public access channel was technically a public forum, while still applying strict scrutiny); 
Jersawitz v. People TV, 71 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1332–33, 1341 (N.D. Ga. 1999) (ruling public access 
channel managed by a non-profit corporation granted authority by the municipality was a designated 
public forum); Glendora v. Marshall, 947 F. Supp. 707, 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating that cable opera-
tor managing public access channel was not a state actor); Britton v. City of Erie, 933 F. Supp. 1261, 
1264–65, 1268 (W.D. Pa. 1995) (deciding public access channel operated by local access authority 
was a public forum), aff’d, 100 F.3d 946 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 93 Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 792 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 94 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 801 (1985). Justice Thomas 
pointed out in his Denver Area opinion that the statement was dicta which was taken out of context. 
Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 827 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 95 See Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 547, 552 (1975) (describing the theater as a pub-
lic forum). A private party was not in charge of enforcing the public forum, as the board members of 
the theatre were appointed by the city’s mayor and approved by the board of commissioners, and the 
chairman of the board was the commissioner of public utilities, grounds, and buildings. Id. at 548 n.2. 
 96 Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 732. 
 97 See id. at 762–63 (describing the management entities of public access channels already in 
place that are separate from the cable operators). 
 98 See id. at 766 (stating the Court’s conclusion that the provision was not necessary or appropri-
ately tailored). 
 99 See Halleck II, 882 F.3d at 303 (discussing how the cable operator was not involved in the 
management of the public access channels). 
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The Second Circuit correctly decided the issue in a narrow decision 
which stated that only the channels at issue in Halleck II were public forums 
due to the specific characteristics of those channels.100 By limiting the public 
forum classification to channels in which the cable operator has no manage-
ment duties, the Second Circuit avoided running afoul of one of the main 
points in Justice Thomas’s dissent in Denver Area: that there is no precedent 
that recognizes a private entity having the obligation to help create and broad-
cast the message being spread.101 Justice Thomas stated that the government 
must traditionally be the one to enforce the openness of the forum in order for 
the forum to be a public forum.102 If the public forum is applied the way the 
Second Circuit and other courts have applied it—namely, only to public access 
channels managed by public entities or private entities acting as public enti-
ties—this tradition of government enforcement will be continued.103 
CONCLUSION 
In February 2018, in Halleck v. Manhattan Community Access Corp., the 
Second Circuit applied the public forum doctrine to public access channels 
managed by a private, non-profit corporation acting as a public entity. By 
avoiding a sweeping proclamation declaring all public access channels to be 
public forums, the Second Circuit promoted the original intent of the public 
forum doctrine to prohibit the government from regulating expression in places 
meant to support the free exchange of ideas. While public access channels may 
seem out of date, the suppression of speech experienced by the Halleck plain-
tiffs at the hands of a state actor is something that the judiciary must continue 
to guard against. 
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 100 See id. at 306 (declining to classify all public access channels as public forums, and instead 
ruling on the characteristics of the channels at issue). 
 101 See Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 829 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stat-
ing the normal practice of cable operators to “shoulder[] the burden of administering and enforcing the 
openness of the expressive forum” when that role was traditionally carried out by the government). 
 102 See id. (stating there is no precedent of requiring a private actor to help create and disseminate 
a message for someone else). 
 103 See id. (noting public access channels are often run by the cable operator); Halleck II, 882 
F.3d at 306 (describing MNN’s relation to the municipality). 
